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Are Inflation Measures Really Measuring Inflation?
Abstract
This paper challenges the underlying assumptions that form the basis for current US
inflation measurement. Standard inflation models implicitly treat all divergences of
sector price changes as temporary noise. Based on this logic, the only force driving
price level changes over time must be the underlying inflation rate. This paper
proposes an alternative model that allows for persistent sector-specific price
changes, and then conducts statistical tests to determine if sector price changes
represent significant alternate forces driving measured inflation. The tests show
that several sectoral forces are distorting measured inflation, indicating that
traditional inflation gauges are not measuring underlying inflation properly for
policy purposes. These distortions suggest that the Federal Reserve’s decision to
announce an explicit 2% inflation target may have been misguided. The 2% target
may not be appropriate during times when sector-specific forces are the dominant
drivers of measured inflation.
Keywords: inflation, sectoral analysis, consumer price index, inflation
measurement, Fed policy, inflation target
Section 1: What is inflation and how do we measure it?
When the subject of inflation comes up, invariably the discussion centers on the
standard measures of inflation: the consumer price index (CPI) and the personal
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consumption expenditure (PCE) deflator.1 These measures have become
synonymous with inflation in the eyes of the public. However, the concept of
inflation is fundamentally different from these measures.
Inflation is the increase in the general price level over the medium to long
term. It is the portion of the rise in goods and services prices that is both
common to all prices and persistent over time.
While the concept of inflation seems straightforward, it is extremely challenging in
practice to measure the general price level for everything that is purchased.
Economists have wrestled with measuring true underlying inflation for decades.
They have found ways to deal with complications such as the weighting and
combining of price changes and the accounting for new and substitute products.
However, economists have not yet found an inflation measure that truly captures
the medium- to long-term concept of changes in the general price level. Real world
data exhibit month-to-month fluctuations that are not related to underlying inflation.
How can idiosyncratic short-term fluctuations be separated from common and
persistent price changes? There have been many attempts to statistically see
through the noise to the underlying inflation path, most of which have entailed
modifying the CPI and the PCE deflator by taking out volatile components to isolate
“core” measures. The most common adjustment is to exclude food and energy
1

For a full accounting of the differences between the CPI and the PCE deflator, see McCully, Moyer,

and Stewart [2007]. Since the PCE deflator uses the CPI survey as its source data, the analysis in this
paper focuses solely on CPI data.
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components, because fluctuations in these categories rarely reflect underlying
inflation trends. Other methods tried include trimmed-mean and median inflation
measures, which minimize the impact of the most extreme sector price changes each
month (Bryan and Cecchetti [1994], Cecchetti [1996], Meyer [2013]). Khan, Morel
and Sabourin [2013] and Amstad and Potter [2014] present measures of underlying
inflation based on factor models.
Economists do not always agree on the best way to gauge the underlying inflation
rate. Many modifications of the CPI and PCE deflator are summarized, reviewed and
evaluated in Rich and Steindel [2007], who find that price movements are too
volatile to make a case for any particular version of core inflation. Kiley [2008] finds
that core measures that exclude food and energy are best, while Meyer, Venkatu and
Zaman [2013] find the trimmed mean CPI to be most accurate. Wynne [2008] offers
a discussion of the goals of inflation measurement and the benefits of using core
measures for making policy decisions. Bullard [2011] presents an opposing point of
view, arguing that policymakers should focus instead on headline inflation measures,
which “were designed to be the best measures of inflation available.”
Each of the attempts to measure underlying, common price changes implicitly
assumes that variations in sector price changes are short term and random, so they
gravitate to zero over time.
This study takes an entirely different approach and challenges the basic
assumptions of the standard inflation model. It asks the question: Are individual
price changes driven by a single underlying inflation rate as the standard model
4

assumes, or are there other persistent sector-specific forces driving price changes
and distorting measured inflation?
If the latter is true, then all of the current measures of inflation would be flawed.
They would be merging sector-specific price changes with underlying inflation. The
core measures and factor models purport to take out at least some sector-specific
price changes, but they only eliminate short-term fluctuations and shocks, not
persistent drivers of price changes. Also, they test their core measures by comparing
with other inflation measures that may have the same flaws.
This paper proposes an alternative model that introduces a term for persistent
sector-specific price changes, and then tests to see if those price changes exert a
significant force on measured inflation. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2
presents the standard and alternative models of inflation, Section 3 reveals that
more than half of the sectors in the CPI have been out of sync with the measured
inflation rate for extended periods, Section 4 takes a closer look at some key sectors,
and Section 5 presents conclusions.
Section 2: Inflation measurement models
Standard model. The traditional model makes the implicit assumption that price
movements of every item in the CPI follow the same pattern
(1) πi = π* + µi
where πi is the actual price change of product i, π* is the underlying inflation rate,
and µi is a catch-all error term that includes random noise and other short-term
5

fluctuations including relative price shocks. In other words, every price rises with
the underlying inflation rate (π*) modified by idiosyncratic short-term noise (µi).2
This generates a distribution of price increases and decreases. In the end, all prices
gravitate to the underlying inflation rate.
Inflation measures such as the CPI, which pool together price changes of all the
goods and services consumers purchase into a single weighted average gauge, can
be modeled as
(2) ∑πi = π* + ∑µi
where the sums are weighted averages of all the items in the inflation measure at a
given point in time. The term ∑πi is the measured inflation rate, π* remains the
underlying inflation rate common to all prices, and ∑µi represents a weighted
average of all short-term fluctuations. According to the central limit theorem, if
there are enough prices being measured, the short-term sector-specific µi’s will
approximate a normal distribution and the expected value of ∑µi will be zero. As a
result, the measure of inflation (∑πi) will equal the underlying value (π*) on average.
The problem with this model is the assumption that all sector fluctuations are shortlived and contained in the ∑µi term. The model does not allow for persistent shocks,
which introduces a possible bias into inflation measurements.

2

Amstad and Potter [2014] used this assumption in creating the FRBNY’s inflation gauge, which is

designed to capture the underlying persistent inflation rate by looking at wide array of individual
prices.
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Alternative model. Unlike the assumption in the standard model above that all
sector fluctuations are short-lived, this study proposes that persistent sector price
changes could exist that are driven by other forces. If that is the case, individual
prices may be written as
(3) πi = π* + ρi + µi
where ρi represents idiosyncratic persistent price changes in a particular sector.
Under this assumption, inflation measures would combine individual price changes
to yield an inflation measure that looks like
(4) ∑πi = π* + ∑ρi + ∑µi
where ∑ρi is the weighted average of the effects of all idiosyncratic persistent price
changes of individual sectors.
In this model, in addition to the underlying inflation term π*, there are now two
types of idiosyncratic sector price changes: the same short-term noise term (∑µi) as
in the standard model, and the new term representing medium- to long-term price
changes driven by sector-specific forces (∑ρi). Unlike the ∑µi term, there is no
reason to expect the value of the persistent sector-specific term ∑ρi equals zero.
If ∑ρi is zero, then the expected value of Equation 4 would be the same as that of
Equation 2 (the underlying inflation rate π*), and the assumptions of the traditional
model would hold. On the other hand, if ∑ρi is not zero, inflation measures would be
distorted because they would be combining underlying inflation (which they are
trying to measure) with sector-specific price changes.
7

Section 3: Persistent divergence of price changes
The study now tests to see if sector-specific price changes are short-lived random
shocks as the standard model assumes, or if sector price changes persist beyond any
reasonable definition of short-term. In other words, are the ρi terms significant
drivers of measured inflation?
To check for persistence, this study compared the price changes from 54 sectors in
the CPI against the measured inflation rate for every year going back to 1998.3
Specifically, the study counted the number of times in the past 19 years that sector
prices increased at a faster/slower pace than the core CPI. This is akin to running a
19-flip coin toss experiment 54 times.
If the price fluctuations can be represented by µi, alone, they must be short-term,
unbiased, and random. That means the number of times sector prices rise faster or
slower than the core CPI should be roughly even for most series. The distribution of
these relative sector prices changes would look like the gray bars in Figure 1, which
represents the probabilities from a 50-50 coin flip example. In contrast, if the sector
price changes are persistent and should be represented by ρi, the number of times
these sector prices rise faster or slower than core CPI should be skewed.
The results were surprising. As the black bars in Figure 1 show, the actual price
change data revealed that more than half the values were in the tail regions (less

3

Source data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and Haver Analytics. The study looks at prices

changes for all items that have been in the CPI since 1998 – except food products and energy.

8

than five heads or more than 14 heads at the 1 percent significance level).4
Specifically, of the 54 observations, 17 were below five and 18 were above 14. These
results showed unmistakable evidence that deviations in price changes by sector
tend to persist well beyond any reasonable sense of the short term. A binomial exact
test on these data rejected the notion that the individual short-term fluctuations
were random with 99 percent confidence.
This analysis has demonstrated the persistence of divergent price changes across
sectors, suggesting that underlying inflation is not the only long-term driver of price
changes. Furthermore, current models are not equipped to separate these persistent
sector-specific price changes from the persistent changes common to all prices that
defines true underlying inflation.
Section 4: Multiple driving forces
Now the study turns to the question of how and why some prices rise faster or
slower than others over prolonged periods. One possibility is the split between
goods and services. Are goods and services driven by different forces?

4

The chart compares two histograms. Gray: The horizontal axis shows the possible number of heads

from a hypothetical experiment of flipping a coin 19 times. This experiment is repeated 54 times and
the vertical axis shows the number of times the experiment likely would yield each number of heads,
based on standard probabilities. Black: The horizontal axis shows the possible number of years that
each item’s price changes were higher than core CPI. The experiment is repeated for all 54 items. The
vertical axis counts the number of items whose price changes exceeded core CPI zero times through
19 times.
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Over the past 20 years, services (excluding energy) prices have increased by an
average of nearly 3 percent, while goods (excluding food and energy) prices have
barely increased at all on average. In fact, goods price increases surpassed services
in only one year of the past 20 (Figure 2). Not only are these price changes
significantly and persistently different, but goods and services prices are not
positively correlated, as you would expect if they were driven by the same force,
such as an underlying price level. The correlation coefficient between these two
series over this time frame is negative 0.41.
This divergence probably reflects the fact that goods prices are increasingly being
determined by the global market. The import content of private domestic demand
has increased sharply over the past several decades. In 1970, imports accounted for
just 10 percent of private domestic demand, and today that figure is 44 percent. So,
the excess global capacity of traded goods could be dampening goods prices. This
would explain the lack of price increases over the past two decades, despite the rise
in US services prices. It would also explain why these prices do not tend to adjust to
the degree of slack in the domestic economy, as the Phillips curve would suggest.
Meanwhile, services by their nature are dependent on domestic pricing conditions,
especially labor costs, because labor is the most important input for services. As
such, these prices may mostly reflect the rise in the general price level. That may be
why recent studies show that services exhibit the strongest Phillips curve tendency.5

5

See Seydl and Spittler [2016].
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To see if the divergence between goods and services pricing explains the persistence
in the histogram experiments above, the same analysis was performed comparing
individual services prices against all services prices (excluding energy) and
individual goods prices against all goods prices (excluding food and energy). If the
goods/services split explained all of the persistent variations, the phenomenon
would disappear when compared with goods and services separately. The results
showed that the split between goods and services explained some, but not all, of the
persistent variations (Figures 3 and 4). Many items that can be categorized as goods
or services followed similar patterns of price changes. However, even when the data
were split into goods and services, there were a significant number of observations
in the tails.
It turns out that nearly all the remaining outliers were in just three sectors: medical
care, education and technology. The fact that these sectors seem to move on their
own with independent drivers should not be too surprising. Medical care is largely
disconnected from economy-wide drivers because employer-financed health
insurance has created a system where medical pricing is not transparent to
consumers.6 Likewise, education costs have skyrocketed as student loans have
expanded, allowing colleges to ramp up prices.7 Finally, technological quality has
consistently improved over the past two decades, resulting in steady (quality-

6

See Reinhart [2013].
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See Lucca, Nadauld and Shen [2017].

11

adjusted) product price declines over the entirety of the tech revolution since the
1990s.8
Section 5: What this means for Fed policy
Since monetary policymakers do not have the tools to manage sector-specific price
changes, their best course of action would seem to be to conduct policy based on
movements in the underlying inflation rate common to all goods and services. But as
this paper shows, underlying inflation cannot be separated from persistent sectorspecific price changes. A central bank conducting policy toward a specific inflation
target using traditional inflation measures as a guide could not be sure that the
target was consistent with the desired underlying inflation rate.
By announcing an explicit target of 2%, the Federal Reserve locked itself into policy
positions to achieve that goal. However, if the weighted average of persistent sectorspecific price changes is significantly positive or negative, the published inflation
data may not truly reflect underlying inflation. As a result, Fed policy could end up
being persistently too tight or easy.

8

The rise in owners’ equivalent rent (OER), which comprises nearly 25% of the CPI, has persistently

exceeded core CPI increases as well, but the overshoots seem to be explained by the general
overshoot of all services, as the OER observation in Figure 4 was close to the middle. However,
because OER represents such a substantial weight in inflation measures and the divergences have
been large, it should be noted that this sector alone can account for a sizable ρi term and distort
estimates of π*.
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This study recommends that the Fed should take a more holistic approach to policy,
given these newly identified uncertainties surrounding underlying inflation. For
example, the Fed would have more flexibility if it targeted an inflation band that was
wide enough to encompass a reasonable range of sector-specific price change effects.
The course of action would be to keep inflation steady within a band and adjust
policy if imbalances begin to develop.
Research extensions. This study has covered a 19-year period in which inflation
was modest by historical standards. This analysis could be extended to include a
period of generally higher inflation. At high underlying inflation rates, the sectorspecific forces could tend to be obscured because common, persistent inflation is the
predominant driver of price changes. In those instances, π* could be more
distinguishable from the sector-specific drivers. This could generate a contrast with
the results from the low inflation period studied here, where the underlying
inflation rate does not dominate as much, and measures of the true underlying
inflation are not as clearly defined.
Finally, this paper leaves for further research a new attempt to measure the
common underlying inflation rate, based on the alternative inflation model
specification, which takes full account of persistent sector-specific price changes.
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Figure 1: Frequency of Above Core CPI vs Coin Toss
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Figure 2: Core Goods and Services
Year-to-Year Percent Change
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Figure 3: Frequency of Goods Overshooting vs Coin Toss
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Figure 4: Frequency of Services Overshooting vs Coin Toss
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